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LEGISLATION
Compelling the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in
Criminal Trials
The passage by New York in 1932,1 Pennsylvania in 1935,2 and New Jer-
sey in 1936 a of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State in Criminal Cases 4 is part of a recent legislative trend whereby
a material witness for a prosecution in one state is prevented from placing himself
beyond process by simply entering or remaining in another. Although the
necessity of such a statute has been given wide publicity among crime commis-
sions i and law advancement bodies 6 only in recent years, it in fact originated
in the New England states in 179I,7 all of which adopted statutes on the subject
by 19o7.s While these older and more experimental laws are naturally inferior
to the Uniform Act, approved in 1931, one-half of the states, including the older
group, now have acts pertaining to sending witnesses into, and procuring them
from, other states.9
The necessity for statutes of this type has arisen from an increased desire
for more stringent enforcement of the law,10 combined with the defendant's
constitutional right of confrontation which prevents the use of depositions against
him in a criminal trial."- A series of statutes has been produced providing for
extra-state depositions on application of the defendant in criminal trials, 2 but
i. N. Y. Laws 1932, c. 255.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. i, §§ 616-622.
3. N. J. Laws 1936, c. 40.
4. For the text of this Act as recommended to the states, see 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1936)
7-10.5. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE (1931) 35; PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY (1929) 94; PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERSTATE CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1935) 21-22;
REPORT OF THE [California] COMMIssION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1927)
30-31: REPORT OF THE CRIME COMMISSION OF MICHIGAN (1930) 15-17; REPORT OF THE MIN-
NESOTA CRIME COMMISSION (1934) 43.
6. The text as adopted by the American Law Institute is identical with the approved Uni-
form Act except for a few unimportant particulars. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ADMISITRA-
TION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Tent. Draft No. I, 1931) 8-1o. For the differences between the
two proposed statutes before collaboration, see HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (I93I) 42 et seq.
7. N. H. Laws (792) pp. 251-252.
8. For the present statutes see infra note 37. In addition to New Hampshire, the original
Acts are as follows: Conn. Acts 19o3, c. 87; Me. Laws 1855, c. 184; Mass. Laws 1873, c. 319;
R. I. Laws 19o7, c. 1462; Vt. Acts 1878, no. 43, p. 5I.
g. For the individual Acts, see infra notes 22-23, 25-26, 29-33, 37. Two-thirds of this
legislation has originated in the last five years.
IO. The Minnesota Crime Commission has recommended the Act ". . . to abrogate
one of the most effective means used by the modem gangster to escape punishment, that of
'spiriting away', by intimidation or bribery, the witnesses for the state before trial." RE-
PORT OF THE MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION (1934) 43.
Ii. U. S. CONST. Amend. VI. This right exists in every state but Idaho in either the
state constitution or in statutory form. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1397, n. I.
12. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 5624; ARIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5191;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §3112; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1349;
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6482; 4 FLA. COmp. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) §8390; 1
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 19, §3101; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) C. 62, § 1313; ME. REv.
STAT. (930) C. 146, § I9; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 277, § 76; 3 MICH. COmP. LAWS
(I929) § 17291; I Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3621; 5 MONT. REV. CODE (935) § 12199; NEB.
COMP. STAT. (1929) C. 29, § I904; 5 NEv. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) C. 41; 2 N. J. COMP.
(717)
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this form of producing evidence is not available to the prosecution. Add to this
situation the fact that at common law no state court could compel a witness who
was within another state to testify in any type of proceeding,1 8 and it becomes
evident that the only solution to the problem of obtaining evidence for the prose-
cution from beyond the state lies in action by the legislatures.14
The Uniform Act
The Uniform Act on the subject functions only between two states each of
which has provided for sending witnesses into the other. The machinery is set in
motion when the judge of a court of record in state A certifies under seal of
the court that X, a person within the borders of state B, is needed for a given
number of days as a material witness in a criminal prosecution then pending in
the certifying court. 15 Upon receipt of this certificate by a judge of a court of rec-
ord of that county of state B where X then is present, he is notified that a hearing
has been fixed for him at a given time and place.-" State B directs X by summons
to appear and testify in the court of state A only if, upon the hearing, it develops
that (a) there is no "undue hardship" involved in the trip, (b) X will not have
to travel more than one thousand miles "by the ordinary traveled route" to the
place of trial, and (c) the laws of state A and of all other states through which
X must travel allow him protection from arrest and from the service of civil and
criminal process while he is within their jurisdiction for the specified purpose.'7
If X fails "without good cause" to obey the summons after being tendered ten
cents for each mile he must travel and five dollars for each day he is to spend in
travel and attendance at the court, he is punished by state B according to the
penalty there provided for disobeying a summons issued from a court of record.'8
To facilitate the above procedure each state enacts provisions for the issu-
ance of the certificate and the tender of the required sum,19 as well as for the
hearing and punishment of the witness when a reciprocating state initiates the
process.20  And it further grants protection from arrest and from civil and
criminal process to any witness attending court on its request or passing through
it on his way to or from a trial in a third state.
2'
Existent Statutes
The existence of the Uniform Act as above outlined by no means indicates
uniformity in all the twenty-four statutes on the subject: some, being older, are
STAT. (gio) p. 2230, §36; N. Y. CODE CIM. PRO. (Cahill, 1928) §§636-657; 2 N. D.
Comp. LAvs (1913) c. 14, art. 3; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934)
§ I3444-11; I OKIA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) art. 26; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. I9,
§ 611; I S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 5o16-A; TENN. CODE (1932) § 11960; TEX. STAT. (Code
Crim. Pro. 1928) c. 8; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §§ 1930, 2562; W. VA. CODE (1932) § 619o;
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) C. 33, § 812.
13. See Baker v. People, 72 Colo. 68, 74, 209 Pac. 791, 794 (1922) ; State v. Rasor, I68
S. C. 221, 225, 167 S. E. 396, 398 (I933).
z4. In fact there is one cumbersome statutory mode of securing the evidence of a witness
for the prosecution who is in another state without compelling his attendance at the trial.
This consists of taking the witness' deposition with the defendant and counsel also present.
The disadvantages of such procedure are obvious. See OHio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's
Baldwin, 1934) § 13444-14
I5. § 2, 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1936) 9. There is nothing in the wording of the Act to pre-
vent its being used for the defendant.
I6. § I, id. at 8.
17. § 3, id. at g.
18. §1, id. at 8.
19. § 2, id. at 9.
20. § 1, id. at 8.
21. §3, id. at 9.
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less complete than the Act, while other later ones are even more complete. A
grouping of the existent statutes and an examination of their exact provisions is
of primary importance in determining the extent to which the courts will go in
deciding whether two given laws, perhaps in different groups, are sufficiently
reciprocal to be applied in a given instance. The statutes fall principally into
three groups: the first consists of those passed since the Uniform Act was recom-
mended to the states, and embodies all its provisions. Twelve statutes in this
first classification are couched in approximately the same wording as that of the
Act,22 while six others include further provision in the interest of protection to
the witness or greater efficiency in administration. Thus a witness from Idaho
need travel no more than the usual thousand miles to the court, but he may do so
if he gives his written consent; 23 and a witness brought to Idaho may be required
to remain in the state longer than his certificate specifies, upon compliance with a
like condition.24  A witness from Michigan need proceed to another state only
if a felony is to be prosecuted there, 25 whereas one from New Jersey or New York
must proceed even to a grand-jury investigation.26  The New Jersey law inter-
feres with the liberty of the witness more than any other, by further providing
that at the termination of the hearing he can be taken into immediate custody
and delivered to an officer of the requesting state, on receipt of such recommen-
dation in the certificate, in lieu of being merely served with a subpoena, 27 and that
a visiting witness may be forced to remain in New Jersey after the expiration of
the time mentioned in the certificate without his consent .2  The Minnesota law
specifically states that the witness can be subpoenaed for either the prosecution or
the defense in the pending "criminal action".29 The law of Tennessee is the least
effective and most carelessly phrased in the group, providing that no witness will
be sent out of the state unless the trial of a felony is pending, and even in such
case the person must be a resident of the state. But witnesses can be requested
from other states "in felony cases" for "appearance before the grand jury or
court".30
The second group is composed of the statutes of Iowa 
31 and Louisiana, 2
and the earlier New York law, 8 which is of particular importance since it is the
22. Ark. Acts 1935, no. 65, p. 144; IN. STAT. (Supp. May, 1935) §§ 2257-1-2257-5; Me.
Acts 1933, c. 152; 5 NEV. Comp. LAWs (Hillyer, Supp. 1934) N 11359-11359.06; N. D.
Laws 1933, C. 217; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 114; PA. STAT. AN i'. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. ig,
§§ 616-622; R. I. Laws 1936, c. 2382; S. D. Laws 1933, c. 205; W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 36; Wis.
Laws 1933, c. 48; Wyo. Laws 1935, c. 120 (requires payment of only 8 cents per mile to wit-
nesses sent from Wyoming, but authorizes tender of usual io cents per mile fee to those re-
quested by it from other states).
23. Idaho Laws 1935, c. 10, § 19-29o4-A (i) (i5 cents per mile).
24. Id. § I9-2904-A (2).
25. Mich. Acts 1935, no. 246, p. 418.
26. N. J. Laws 1936, c. 40, § 2; N. Y. CODE CGlM. PRO. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 618a.
27. N. 3. Laws 1936, c. 40, § 2. Further, in such case, the judge may direct that the wit-
ness be brought before him physically, instead of notifying him that a hearing has been set.
Authority is also given in § 3 for a like procedure by other states at the request of New Jer-
sey, and for the delivery of the visiting witness into custody of the proper New Jersey
authority.
28. N. J. Laws 1936, c. 40, § 3.
29. 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§ 98Ig-I, 2. The certificates must issue from,
and be received by, and the action must be in the district courts of Minnesota.
3o. TENN. CODE (1932) §§ 11976-11979. The authorized fee for those leaving and enter-
ing the state is only 5 cents per mile and 4 dollars per day.
31. IoWA CODE (1931) c. 646, §§ 13893-13896.
32. LA. CODE CRIn. PRO. (Dart, 1932) art. 673.
33. N. Y. CODE CI m. PRo. (Cahill, 1928) § 618a. This section has now been repealed
and a new statute passed which includes almost the exact wording of the Uniform Act. N. Y.
CODE CRIm. PRo. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 618a. For an excellent criticism of the former act,
see Medalie, Itter-State Exchange of Witnesses it Crininal Cases (1929) 33 LAw NoTEs 166.
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only act the constitutionality of which has been tested. These acts also demand,
in the case of sending witnesses from their own state, that the requesting state
shall have reciprocal legislation, but the New York and Louisiana statutes are
limited to a bordering state and to a pending trial for a felony.
4 All provide for
a hearing before sending the witness, as well as for punishment for disobeying
the order, but none makes specific provision for requesting witnesses from any
other state, nor does any accord protection from process and arrest to the visitor,
although such protection is required in the case of witnesses sent to other states.
35
Except for the provision as to bordering states, these laws are almost identical
with the second tentative draft of the Uniform Act. 6
The third group includes the laws of all the New England states except
Maine and Rhode Island,17 and since they are the earliest and briefest on the
subject, their inferiority is patent. As in the second group, provision is made
only for sending the witness, not for requesting him, and there is no reciprocal
clause. Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont generously place no limita-
tion on where the witness is to be sent, but Rhode Island stipulates only the New
England states, and Massachusetts limits the privilege to an adjoining state or
Maine. The witness, who must in all cases be a resident of the state, is accorded
no hearing before being ordered to attend court in the summoning state, and
again no provision is made for protecting visiting witnesses from process. These
laws specify the punishment for failure to obey the order, which, in every case, is
only a fine or forfeiture and not imprisonment. 8
In addition to these state laws, Congress recently has made it unlawful for
any person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to avoid giving
testimony in criminal proceedings in any state wherein a felony is charged.39 And
though of course not analogous in any sense, a federal statute has long existed
providing that subpcenas may be issued from a federal court in any judicial
district to a witness in any other district in the United States, if such witness is
desired for a criminal case.40
Constitutionality
The constitutionality of statutes of this type remains undecided by a court
of last resort. None of the acts discussed in groups one and three above has ever
been jested, and the decision on the former New York statute of the second group
34. Ibid.; LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. (Dart, 1932) art. 673.
35. IOWA CODE (931) c. 646, § 13896; LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. (Dart, 1932) art. 673; N. Y.
CODE CRIM. PRO. (Cahill, 1928) § 618a.
36. This draft appears in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (928) 431-433.
37. 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6429; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 233, 8§ 12-13; 2
N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 336, §§ 16-17; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 2558-2559. The former
act of Maine, ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 134, § 12, was supplanted in 1933 by the Uniform Act.
Me. Acts 1933, c. 152. That of Rhode Island, R. I. GEN. LAWs (1923) c. 342, §§ 16-17, was
likewise replaced by R. I. Laws 1936, c. 2382.
38. Connecticut, fine up to $3oo; Massachusetts, forfeiture up to $3oo; New Hampshire,
forfeiture up to $3oo; Rhode Island, fine up to $2oo; Vermont, fine up to $5oo. See supra
note 37.
39. 48 STAT. 782 (I934), 18 U. S. C. A. § 4o8e (Supp. 1936). The act has been termed
a temporary expedient to be used till such time as the states, by compact or uniform
law, shall provide for the return of witnesses who have left the trial jurisdiction." Dean,
Interstate Compacts for Crime Control in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CON-
FERENCE ON CRIME (I934) 64, 68.
4o. 42 STAT. 848 (1922), as amended by 43 STAT. 1265 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 654
(1928). This law is based on one which originated in 1793. I STAT. 335 (793).
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was handed down by a divided court,41 four justices upholding the validity of the
law, while Justice Laughlin vigorously dissented. The disagreement centered
about the relation of the statute to the questions of deprivation of liberty without
due process of law,42 the privilege of citizens of the United States freely to enter
and leave any state,43 the making by one state of an unsigned agreement with
another without the consent of Congress, 44 and the power of a state to order an
affirmative act to be done beyond its borders. Although the statute then under
consideration was inferior to the Uniform Act as now commonly adopted, it
involved the same constitutional questions, so that an examination of the problems
discussed therein is applicable to the validity of the modem laws as well.
It would seem that the constitutional provision that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law has been fully complied with
in the statutes of both groups one and two by the provision therein made for
notice and a hearing before the issuance of the summons to attend court in the
foreign state.45 Even the older New England statutes would probably be held
valid in this respect, since the witness is notified by receiving the summons to
attend the requesting court, and can move to vacate it if he desires. By so acting
he can secure a hearing for himself and show just cause why he should not be
compelled to obey the order.
The ground on which the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution has been invoked against the New York statute is that by
compelling a person within one state to proceed into another for a given
time, the Act abridges the privilege of citizens of the United States of free
ingress and egress from the states. This objection applies equally to all three
groups of existent statutes. However, while such a privilege has been held to
adhere to national, as well as to state, citizenship,4 it is well settled that thel
enjoyment of any privilege by any citizen is coincident with the duty to aid the
41. Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 13o N. Y. Supp. 713 (ist Dep't, igiI), iX
COL. L. REV. 786, 25 HAv. L. REV. 188. This case overruled the only other existing one on
the subject, it re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 90 N. Y. Supp. 808 (Sup. Ct.
1904), z8 HA-uv. L. REv. 466 (905), in which an admittedly hurried decision, without citation
of authority, pronounced the same New York statute invalid. The title of the case, together
with the fact that the judge in the later New York case says Pennsylvania had such an act,
would indicate that there was an earlier Pennsylvania statute on the subject which fulfilled
the requirement of reciprocity in the New York law. But no such act existed.
42. Such deprivation is forbidden to the states in U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV. The vari-
ous state constitutions also contain a guarantee of due process in their Bills of Rights. Ex-
cept in this instance, the state constitutions do not contain provisions pertinent to the subject.
43. U. S. CoxsT. Amend. XIV prohibits any state from making or enforcing a law
abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
44. This is prohibited in U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § IO, cl. 3.
45. § I, 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1936) 8.
46. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867) ; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78, 97 (19o8). The dissenting justice in Massachusetts v. Klaus seems to have failed to distin-
guish between the privileges of citizens of the several states and those of citizens of the United
States, and likewise between the purposes of that clause of the Constitution granting the citi-
zens of each state the privileges of those of the several states [U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2], and
the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing the privileges of citizens of the United
States against abridgment. See Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 8og-81o, 13o
N. Y. Supp. 713, 721 (Ist Dep't, 1911). But these sets of privileges differ. See Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74 (U. S. 1872). Likewise the purposes of the clauses differ: the
first merely declares that each state shall grant to the citizens of other states who are within
its jurisdiction the same privileges which it accords its own citizens. See Slaughter House
Cases, x6 Wall. 36, 77 (U. S. 1872) ; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 298 (1920).
The only possible basis of objection to the Act's constitutionality is Amendment XIV and not
Art. IV, § 2.
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government by giving evidence; 47 and that duty is not limited by state boun-
daries.48 The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to ban such a
temporary interference with free movement, in the interest of the security of the
state, for every citizen who attends any trial as witness or juryman is, in the
same sense, deprived of the privilege of leaving the state.
The view is equally unsound that the legislature, agreeing in a statute to
send witnesses to other states who have enacted like laws, has in effect made an
unsigned agreement with those other states without the consent of Congress."9
The basic difference between an "agreement", involving action by representatives
of two or more states and approval by their legislatures, and reciprocal legisla-
tion is well recognized. 50 But even if it were to be conceded that such reciprocal
legislation constitutes an "agreement", a Congressional enactment of 1934 has
settled the question by providing that Congressional consent is given in advance
to the states to enter into agreements or compacts for mutual assistance in" . . .
the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws
and policies . . . 51
One question of fundamental importance in determining the validity of all
statutes for the exchange of witnesses lies in the fact that the state is compelling
a person over whom it has jurisdiction to do an affirmative act beyond the state
borders, and is punishing him for failure to obey. It is claimed that since the
orders of the courts generally have no extraterritorial effect, such a one is beyond
the power of the court to make, and need not be obeyed. The nearest analogy
is the power of courts of equity to order acts done in another state, and although
the weight of the older authority denies the existence of jurisdiction for such a
purpose 5 2 there has been a tendency to adopt the view that when a court obtains
valid jurisdiction over any person, that jurisdiction exists for all purposes, and
includes the power to order an act done beyond the state borders. 8 The ques-
tion of whether or not such order should be given is only one of expediency in
the particular case.
Two difficulties largely caused general adherence to the old view, and still
loom large in the question of expediency today: these are (i) the possibility that
47. Blair v. United States, 250 U.) S. 273 (1919). Of course the duty is subject to cer-
tain exceptions, e. g. self-incrimination.
48. Thus statutes providing for the giving of a deposition for use in civil cases in another
state are found in every jurisdiction. Note (1929) 43 HAv. L. REv. 121, 123, n. 5. As to
depositions for criminal cases to be taken in foreign states, see supra note 12.
49. This criticism, it should be noted, does not apply to the New. England laws, since
they contain no requirement of reciprocal action by other states.
50. Dean, Interstate Compacts for Crime Control in NEW JERSEY CONFERENCE ON CRIME
(1935) 20; Report to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on Interstate Compacts in
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIssIONERs ON UNIFORIM STATE LAWS
(1921) 299-300; Toll, State Legislation in the Field of Criminal Law in PROCEmINCS OF THE
ATTORNEY'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1934) 366, 375.
51. 48 STAT. 909 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §42o (Supp. 1936). This statute has been
characterized as "a direct challenge to the states" to assume their duties in non-local crime
problems. Dean, Interstate Compacts for Crime Control in PRoCEEINGS OF THE ATTORNEY-
GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1934) 64, 66.
52. People ex rel. Van Dyke v. Colorado C. R. R., 42 Fed. 638 (C. C. D. Colo. 189o);
Port Royal R. R. v. Hammond, 58 Ga. 523 (1877) ; People v. Central R. R. of N. J., 42 N. Y.
283 (187o). See also Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HmAv. L.
REV. 283, 293.
53. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245
Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) ; Madden v. Rosseter, 114 Misc. 416, 187 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup.
Ct. I92I), aff'd, 196 App. Div. 891, 187 N. Y. Supp. 943 (ist Dep't, 1921). See also RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 94.
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the other state would order the act not to be done, thus forcing the individual
to disobey one of two authorities, and (2) the difficulty of enforcing the order
after the person leaves the ordering state. 4 But in the situation under exami-
nation the state where the trial is to be held has already shown a willingness that
the command should be given, thus disposing of the first matter. And as to the
second, the same difficulty of enforcement exists to a slightly less degree in any
case where affirmative action is required or forbidden: if the order is not to do an
act in another state, the person may still proceed there and do it; if it is to
do an act in the ordering state, the person may leave the state instead.
The statutes include other elements of expediency which must be satisfied
before the order to summon the witness will be issued. Thus in group one they
include the determination that the -witness is material and necessary and that the
trip will cause him no "undue hardship." In the second group they embrace the
need to attend only the trial of a felony, in addition to the determination as to the
materiality of the witness. In the third they are non-existent.
On the above grounds statutes on this subject are constitutionally valid at
their present stage of development, and the case of Massachusetts v. Klaus,
while not the decision of a court of last resort, can well be followed today.
5
Efficacy
Although half the states have legislation of the general type, certain pro-
visions in the most numerous and complete class of statutes minimize the chance
of securing a witness in a specific instance. Seventeen states demand (a) that
the laws of the requesting state provide for sending witnesses to them, (b) that
the requesting state and all intervening ones grant immunity from arrest and the
service of civil and criminal process to one within such state for the given pur-
pose, and (c) that the requesting court be not more than one thousand miles
away, before the witness can be sent.56 And when these conditions are fulfilled
there still remain the questions of expediency discussed above. Each of the
conditions takes its toll: one who knows his presence will be desired can defeat-
the purpose of the statute and still both leave and enter states which have passed
the Uniform Act, either by making certain that the county he enters is more than
one thousand miles from the court which will send for him, or by placing between
himself and that court a state which has not accorded him the required protec-
tion. He even more simply can accomplish his end by merely entering a state
which has no law on the subject, though of course this is not a defect in the Act
itself. Considering the scattered geographical position of those states which at
present do have such laws, in a majority of instances the possibility of securing
the witness is limited to bordering states. 7
The passage of the Uniform Act by every state would remedy one of the
above difficulties, namely, the requirement of immunity from process in all inter-
vening states; but such a situation will not result for some years, and even then
the thousand mile limit will remain. It thus becomes apparent that changes
54. GoomiCn, CozNLicT OF LAws (1927) 154-156.
55. While the case was correctly decided as to the validity of the statute, the court should
strictly have refused to allow the order to be issued, because the Massachusetts act did not
fulfill the conditions demanded by that of New York, in that it did not exempt the visiting
witness from the service of papers and from arrest as there required. However, the court
preferred to rest the decision on constitutional grounds. For a general treatment following
the holding, see Harker, Compulsory Attendance of Non-Resident Witnesses in Criminal
Cases (1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. 195, which was partially criticized in (1928) 32 LAW NOTES 62.
56. § 1, 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1936) 8.
57. It must be admitted that no matter how widely the Uniform Act is adopted, its use
by bordering states will always surpass other uses made of it.
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should be made in the Uniform Act if it is to have any real efficacy in other than
border states. One of these should be the elimination of the mileage limit. The
problem is complicated by the fact that one governor has already vetoed an act
which lacked such a clause, on the ground of hardship to the witness,5 s but there
is no reason why such a situation should recur. When transportation is quick
and easy and payment ample, and when a judge of sound discretion may refuse
to issue the order if an undue burden on the witness would result therefrom, it
is difficult to see just how hardship enters the picture. No sound reason for a
mileage limit exists, and a notable increase in the efficiency of the Act and of the
present statutes would result from its removal.
The condition requiring immunity from arrest and from the service of civil
and criminal process in all intervening states on the ordinary traveled route can
and should be changed by the inclusion of a clause making it operative only in
the event that the judge giving the hearing is convinced that the witness is liable
to such process or arrest. Since a goodly portion of those who are sent prob-
ably will not be involved with the authorities of the intervening states, in this
way the Act will be made operative in a large number of instances where it is now
of necessity ineffective. In those cases where there is valid need for such pro-
tection, the clause is a useful one: by arrest, at least, the mission of the witness
would be immediately defeated, and in some cases the service of process would
probably have a like effect. It is to be noted, however, that section 3 of the
Uniform Act which guarantees immunity to witnesses from other states who are
visiting or passing through the enacting state should be retained in its entirety.
The scope of the Act should be broadened to include grand-jury proceed-
ings.59 Such a provision would not often be used, but when occasion should arise,
the situation could be met. The hearing by the judge of the sending state would
prevent abuse of such a clause.
Other salutary provisions are those for the amount and mode of payment,
and for punishment. The stipulations of ten cents per mile by the ordinary trav-
eled route, and five dollars for each day that the person is "required to travel and
attend as a witness" 60 are ample, and so clearly phrased as to avoid ambiguity.
It is to be hoped that each state adopting the Act in the future will provide for the
tender of at least these amounts to those whom it requests to attend its courts,
since provision for a lesser amount will not meet the condition imposed by the
sending state on this matter.61 The punishment provided in the Act is clear and
definite, usually taking the form of constructive contempt of court, including liabil-
58. In 1929 the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act on the subject (Pa. Laws 1929,
pp. 1827, 1847) which was recommended by the state Crime Commission and resembled the
Uniform Act except in this provision as to distance. 3 PA. LEGIs. J. (1929) 4763-4764, 4939.
For its text, see PENNSYLVANIA CRIME ComMIssIoN, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(1929) 94. But the bill was vetoed on the ground mentioned.
59. Such action has already been taken in the New Jersey Act, N. J. Laws 1936, c. 40,
§§ 2, 3; New York Act, N. Y. CODE CIuM. PRO. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 618a. TENN. CODE
(932) §§ 11976-11979. The Idaho Act has also taken the step suggested as to sending wit-
nesses to Idaho. Idaho laws 1935, c. 1o, § 19-29o4-A (2).
6o. §§ I and 2 of the Act. This amount is large enough to prevent abuse of the Act,
since the tender of it must precede the obtaining of the witness. The Pennsylvania statute
is somewhat inferior in this respect, since it provides for the payment of the usual amount
for the number of miles the witness "shall be required to travel", and does not say "by ordi-
nary traveled route". This only places another burden of interpretation on the judge. PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. ig, §§ 68, 62o.
6i. For example, the law of Nevada, which otherwise conforms to the Uniform Act,
provides for the tender of only 73/2 cents per mile and 4 dollars per day to the requested wit-
ness. NEV. STAT. 1933, c. 48, § 2. See also TENN. CODE (932) §§ 1,976-11979 (5 cents per
mile and 4 dollars per day).
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ity in a civil suit or payment of a sum to the aggrieved party, plus fine and/or
imprisonment. 62 Some states do not include the civil liability.63.
Statutes for the sending and securing of witnesses beyond state borders are
not yet generally used. Although no figures are available in those states which
have just recently adopted the idea, a series of returns to the American Law
Institute in 1929 are valuable as indicating definite trends in those states which
have had such statutes for the longest comparative time. The reports from the
New England states indicated that the average use was once in three to once in
five years or less. A questionnaire sent by the Iowa authorities to the 99 county
attorneys of the state was returned by 68, of whom 64 reported no use of their
statute, which was passed in 1913, while 2 reported sporadic, and 2 frequent
use of it; 4 reported that they had sometimes sent witnesses to distant states,
and 2 that they had used the law to obtain witnesses from outside the state. Some
of them had never heard of the statute.6 4
Such figures as the above must be held against a background in which less
than ten statutes on the subject existed, many of them faulty. But the present-
day number of twenty-four states which have embraced the idea is sure to rise
steadily. If the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would increase the scope
and effectiveness of their own model Act, and if those states now having inferior
statutes would amend them by adopting the Uniform Act, it is believed that the
ability of a prospective witness to thwart the administration of justice by moving
beyond the state would be non-existent.
M.P.S.
62. Typical statutory provisions are found in I IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 13, § 6io,
tit. I6, §§ 707-709; IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 11333-11336, 12543; 3 MICH. ComP. LAWs (1929)
§§ 14228-14229; MINN. STAT. (927) §§ 98o2, 98o3; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 31,
§§753 (5), 773-774; ORE. CODE (1930) tit. 9, §§ iio9, 111o.
63. Im. STAT. (934) § 2652; ME. REV. STAT. (930) c. 96, § 1220.
64. These figures are all obtained from private correspondence conducted by Professor
Edwin P. Keedy as a member of the committee engaged in drafting a suitable statute for the
American Law Institute. See supra note 6.
